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under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good
approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce
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1 INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of designing budget-feasible mechanisms for a natural model of procure-
ment auctions. In this model, an auctioneer is interested in buying services (or goods) from a set of
agents A. Each agent i ∈ A specifies a cost ci to be paid by the buyer for using his service; crucially,
these costs are assumed to be private information. The auctioneer has a budget B and a valuation
function v(·), where v(S) specifies the value derived from the services of the agents in S ⊆ A. Given
the (reported) costs of the agents, the goal of the auctioneer is to choose a budget-feasible subset
S ⊆ A of the agents, such that the valuation v(S) is maximized. Budget-feasibility here means that∑
i ∈S pi ≤ B, where pi is the payment issued from the mechanism to agent i .
Note that the agents might try to extract larger payments from the mechanism by misreporting
their actual costs—which of course is undesirable from the auctioneer’s perspective. The goal,
therefore, is to design budget-feasible mechanisms that (i) elicit truthful reporting of the costs by all
agents, and (ii) achieve a good approximation with respect to the optimal value for the auctioneer.
What makes the problem so intriguing is the fact that truthfulness and budget-feasibility are two
directly conflicting goals, since the former is achieved by paying as much as needed to make agents
indifferent to lying (see Lemma 2.4). Indicatively, the use of the celebrated truthful VCG mechanism
in this setting completely fails with respect to keeping the payments bounded [40].
The problem of designing budget-feasible mechanisms was introduced by Singer [40] and has
received a lot of attention, both because of its theoretical appeal and of its relevance to several
emerging application domains. A prominent such application is in crowdsourcing marketplaces
(such as Mechanical Turk, Figure Eight and Clickworker) which provide online platforms to procure
workforce (see [4, 26, 31]). Another application is in the context of influence maximization in social
networks, where one seeks to select influential users (see [1, 41]).
We focus on the design of budget-feasible mechanisms for the general class of non-monotone
submodular valuation functions. Submodular objectives constitute an important class of valuation
functions as they satisfy the property of diminishing returns, which naturally arises in many
settings. Most existing works make the assumption that the valuation functions are monotone
(non-decreasing), i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) for S ⊆ T . Although the monotonicity assumption makes sense
in certain applications, there are several examples where it is violated. For example, in the context
of influence maximization in social networks, adding more users to the selected set may sometimes
result in negative influence (see [12]). The most prominent example of a non-monotone submodular
objective studied in our setting is the budgeted max-cut problem [2, 18], where v(·) is determined
by the cuts of a given graph.
A natural generalization of this framework is to assume that the space of feasible sets has some
structure, e.g., the feasible sets form a matroid. This variant has been studied only for additive
valuation functions [1, 35], despite its wide range of applications varying from team formation
to spectrum markets (see [35]). Here we study the problem for monotone and non-monotone
submodular objectives under p-system constraints.
The purely algorithmic versions of these mechanism design problems ask for the maximization
of a (non-monotone) submodular function subject to the constraint that the total cost of the selected
agents does not exceed the budget; often referred to as a knapsack constraint. These problems
are typically NP-hard, hence our focus is on approximation algorithms that compute a close to
optimal solution in polynomial time. From an algorithmic point of view, most of these problems
are well-understood and admit good approximations. However, it is not clear how to appropriately
convert these algorithms into truthful, budget-feasible mechanisms and, up to this work, this goal
had been elusive. Our results illustrate that for the mechanism design problems it is possible to
achieve the same asymptotic guarantees that are known for their algorithmic counterparts.
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Our Contributions.We derive the first budget-feasible and O(1)-approximate mechanisms for
non-monotone submodular objectives, both for the offline and the online setting. Our results for
the online setting hold for the well-studied secretary model, where the agents arrive in a uniformly
random order. Our mechanisms run in polynomial time in the value query model. The highlights
of this work are as follows:
• We obtain the first universally truthful, budget-feasible O(1)-approximation mechanism for
non-monotone submodular objectives in the value query model.
• We derive the first universally truthful, budget-feasible O(1)-approximation online mecha-
nism for non-monotone submodular objectives. As a consequence, we obtain the first O(1)-
approximation algorithm for the non-monotone Submodular Knapsack Secretary Problem (see also
Remark 4.3), a budget constrained variant of the infamous Secretary Problem.
• We give universally truthful, budget-feasible O(p)-approximation mechanisms for both mono-
tone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets
of a p-system. Beyond the additive case, nothing was known for this constrained setting.
• We provide lower bounds illustrating that asymptotically our results are best possible. On a high
level, only trivial guarantees can be achieved in polynomial time if one goes beyond the class of
general submodular functions or imposes constraints beyond downward closed systems.
Technical Challenges. It should be noted that for monotone submodular objectives all known
mechanisms essentially use the same greedy subroutine introduced by Singer [40]: Sort all agents
in decreasing order of marginal value per cost and pick as many agents as possible before hitting
some carefully selected threshold. This is a simplified version of the optimal greedy algorithm of
Sviridenko [43] and indeed gives non-trivial approximation guarantees. Further, due to its simplicity
it also has the other desired properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget-feasibility.
Unfortunately, it is easy to construct examples where running such a greedy algorithm for a
non-monotone objective results in a solution of arbitrarily poor quality. The algorithmic state-of-
the-art for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint, e.g., [16, 24, 32],
provides us with quite involved algorithms on continuous relaxations of the problem that seem very
unlikely to yield monotone allocation rules, and thus truthful mechanisms. The only simple (and
deterministic) exception is the two-pass greedy algorithm of Gupta et al. [28], where it is shown
that running Sviridenko’s greedy algorithm twice and then maximizing without the knapsack
constraint is sufficient to get a deterministic 6-approximation algorithm. Despite being significantly
simpler, however, this two-pass greedy algorithm still suffers with respect to monotonicity. More
recently, several simple randomized greedy approaches for maximizing non-monotone submodular
objectives subject to other (i.e., non-knapsack) constraints were proposed [14, 15, 22, 25]. However,
these approaches are also not applicable here; we refer the interested reader to the discussion in
the full version of our paper [3].
At the heart of our approach lies a novel deterministic greedy algorithm for non-monotone
submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solu-
tions simultaneously, yet prevents agents to jump from one solution to the other by changing their
cost. To do the latter we offer each agent a take-it-or-leave-it price based on an estimate of the
optimal value which we obtain by sampling. Moreover, this is the first mechanism for the problem
where—crucially—the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal value per cost. This
further allows us to appropriately modify the algorithm and adapt it to the online secretary setting
and to settings with additional feasibility constraints, while maintaining all its desired properties.
All of our mechanisms are randomized and, in fact, random sampling is an essential building block
in our approach, as in previous related works [2, 6, 10, 34]. Designing deterministic mechanisms
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seems very challenging and, beyond additive functions [17, 40], no deterministic, polynomial-
time, budget-feasible O(1)-approximation mechanisms are known, except for some special cases
[1, 2, 18, 29, 41]. Obtaining deterministic, budget-feasible, O(1)-approximation mechanisms—or
showing that they do not exist—is an intriguing open problem.
Related Work. As mentioned above, the study of budget-feasible mechanisms was initiated by
Singer [40], who gave a randomized O(1)-approximation mechanism for monotone submodular
functions. Later, Chen et al. [17] significantly improved the approximation ratio and also suggested
a deterministic O(1)-approximation mechanism, albeit with superpolynomial running time. Sev-
eral follow-up results modified this deterministic mechanism so that it runs in polynomial time
for special cases, including coverage functions [1, 41] and information gain functions [29]. For
subadditive functions, Dobzinski et al. [18] suggested a O(log2 n)-approximation mechanism, and
gave the first constant factor mechanisms for a special case of non-monotone objectives, namely
cut functions. The factor for subadditive functions was later improved to O(logn/log logn) by
Bei et al. [10], who also gave a randomized O(1)-approximation mechanism for XOS functions,
albeit in exponential time in the value query model, and further initiated the Bayesian analysis
in this setting.1 Amanatidis et al. [2] suggested O(1)-approximation mechanisms for a subclass of
non-monotone submodular objectives, namely symmetric submodular objectives, however their ap-
proach does not seem to generalize beyond this subclass. For settings with additional combinatorial
constraints, Amanatidis et al. [1] and Leonardi et al. [35] gaveO(1)-approximation mechanisms for
additive valuation functions subject to independent system constraints. There is also a line of related
work under the large market assumption (where no participant can significantly affect the market
outcome), which allows for mechanisms with improved performance (see, e.g., [4, 8, 26, 31, 42]).
The online version of the problem was introduced and studied by Badanidiyuru et al. [6] who
give an O(1)-approximation mechanism for monotone submodular functions. This is closely re-
lated to the purely algorithmic version of the problem (i.e., without the incentives), namely the
Submodular Knapsack Secretary Problem introduced by Bateni et al. [9] as a generalization of the
Knapsack Secretary Problem [5]. Bateni et al. studied the problem for monotone and non-monotone
submodular objectives, although their argument for the latter case is not sound (see Remark 4.3).
While the monotone submodular case has been improved [23] and generalized [30], there is no
follow-up work on the non-monotone case to the best of our knowledge.
On maximization of submodular functions subject to knapsack or other type of constraints, there
is a vast literature, going back several decades (see, e.g., [39, 44]). Focusing on knapsack constraints,
there is a rich line of recent work on developing algorithms on continuous relaxations of the problem
(see, e.g., [16, 20, 24, 32] and references therein) achieving an e-approximation for non-monotone
objectives. However, the most relevant recent work to ours is that of Gupta et al. [28] who proposed
a deterministic 6-approximation algorithm for the non-monotone case, related on a high level to
our main approach. Gupta et al. also gave algorithms for certain constrained secretary problems,
although not with knapsack constraints. When ℓ knapsack constraints and a p-system constraint
are both present, the algorithmic state-of-the-art is a (p + 2ℓ + 1)-approximation algorithm for
the monotone submodular case due to Badanidiyuru and Vondrák [7] and a (2p + 2ℓ + 1)(p + 1)/p-
approximation algorithm for the non-monotone submodular case due to Mirzasoleiman et al. [37].
1Bei et al. [10] propose an O (1)-approximation mechanism for non-decreasing XOS objectives in the much stronger demand
query model. However, they discuss how to extend their result to general XOS functions via the use of vˆ(S ) = maxT ⊆S v(T ).
It is easy to see that vˆ is non-decreasing and that S is an optimal solution of v if and only if it is a minimal optimal solution
for vˆ . Moreover, Gupta et al. [27] proved that if v is general XOS then vˆ is monotone XOS. It should be noted that this
transformation does not work for submodular functions [2]. Therefore, known results for monotone submodular functions
do not extend to the non-monotone case, even in the demand query model.
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2 PRELIMINARIES
We use A = [n] = {1, 2, . . . ,n} to denote a set of n agents. Each agent i is associated with a private
cost ci , denoting the cost for participating in the solution. We consider a procurement auction
setting, where the auctioneer is equipped with a valuation function v : 2A → Q≥0 and a budget
B > 0. For S ⊆ A, v(S) is the value derived by the auctioneer if the set S is selected (for singletons,
we will often write v(i) instead of v({i})). Therefore, the algorithmic goal in all the problems we
study is to select a set S that maximizes v(S) subject to the constraint ∑i ∈S ci ≤ B. We assume
oracle access to v via value queries, i.e., we assume the existence of a polynomial time value oracle
that returns v(S) when given as input a set S .
A function v is non-decreasing (often referred to as monotone), if v(S) ≤ v(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ A.
We consider general (i.e., not necessarily monotone), normalized (i.e., v(∅) = 0), non-negative
submodular valuation functions. Since marginal values are extensively used, we adopt the shortcut
v(i | S) for the marginal value of agent i with respect to the set S , i.e., v(i | S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S).
The following three definitions of submodularity are equivalent. While definition (i) is the most
standard, the other two alternative definitions will be useful later on.
Definition 2.1. A function v , defined on 2A for some set A, is submodular if and only if
(i) v(i | S) ≥ v(i |T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ A, and i < T .
(ii) v(S) +v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪T ) +v(S ∩T ) for all S,T ⊆ A.
(iii) v(T ) ≤ v(S) +∑i ∈T S v(i | S) −∑i ∈S T v(i | S ∪T {i}) for all S,T ⊆ A.
In Section 6 we also deal with valuation functions that come from a superclass of submodular
functions, namely XOS or fractionally subadditive functions. In particular, it is known that non-
negative (monotone) submodular functions are a strict subset of (monotone) XOS functions [27, 33].
Definition 2.2. A function v , defined on 2A for some set A, is XOS or fractionally subadditive, if
there exist additive functions α1, . . . ,αr , for some finite r , such that v(S) = maxi ∈[r ] αi (S).
We often need to argue about optimal solutions of sub-instances of the original instance (A,v, c,B).
Given a cost vector c, and a subset X ⊆ A, we denote by cX the projection of c on X , and by c−X
the projection of c on A X . By opt(X ,v, cX ,B) we denote the value of an optimal solution to the
problem restricted on X . Similarly, opt(X ,v,∞) denotes the value of an optimal solution to the
unconstrained version of the problem restricted on X . For the sake of readability, we usually drop
the valuation function and the cost vector, and write opt(X ,B) and opt(X ,∞), respectively.
Mechanism Design. In the strategic version that we consider here, every agent i ∈ A only has his
true cost ci as private information. Hence, this is a single-parameter environment. A mechanism
M = (f ,p) in our context consists of an outcome rule f and a payment rule p. Given a vector of
cost declarations, b = (bi )i ∈A, where bi denotes the cost reported by agent i , the outcome rule of
the mechanism selects the set f (b) ⊆ A. At the same time, it computes payments p(b) = (pi (b))i ∈A
where pi (b) denotes the payment issued to agent i . Hence, the final utility of agent i is pi (b) − ci .
Unless stated otherwise, our mechanisms run in polynomial time in the value query model.
Further properties we want to enforce in our mechanism design problem are the following.
Definition 2.3. A mechanismM = (f ,p) is
• truthful, if reporting ci is a dominant strategy for every agent i .
• individually rational, if pi (b) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ A, and pi (b) ≥ ci , for every i ∈ f (b).
• budget-feasible, if ∑i ∈A pi (b) ≤ B for every b.
For our randomized mechanisms we use the strong notion of universal truthfulness, which means
that the mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. As all the
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mechanisms we suggest are universally truthful, we will consistently use c = (ci )i ∈A rather than
b = (bi )i ∈A for the declared costs in their description and analysis.
To design truthful mechanisms for single-parameter environments, we use a characterization by
Myerson [38]. We say that an outcome rule f is monotone, if for every agent i ∈ A, and any vector
of cost declarations b, if i ∈ f (b), then i ∈ f (b ′i , b−i ) for b ′i ≤ bi . That is, if an agent i is selected
by declaring cost bi , then he should still be selected by declaring a lower cost. Myerson’s lemma,
below, implies that monotone algorithms admit truthful payment schemes (often referred to as
threshold payments). This greatly simplifies the design of truthful mechanisms, as one may focus on
constructing monotone algorithms rather than having to worry about the payment scheme. For all
of our mechanisms, we assume that the underlying payment scheme is given by Myerson’s lemma.
Lemma 2.4 (Myerson [38]). Given a monotone algorithm f , there is a unique payment scheme p,
such that (f ,p) is a truthful and individually rational mechanism, given by
pi (b) =
{
supb′i ∈[ci ,∞){b ′i : i ∈ f (b ′i , b−i )} , if i ∈ f (b),
0 , otherwise.
Remark 2.5. We may assume, without loss of generality, that in any given instance all the costs
are upper bounded by the budget. To see this notice that neither our mechanisms nor the optimal
offline solution will ever consider any agent with cost higher than B. Furthermore, no agent has an
incentive to misreport a very high true cost. Indeed, due to budget-feasibility, if agent i reports a
cost bi ≤ B instead of his true cost ci > B and is selected, then he has utility pi (b) − ci < B − B = 0.
Thus, in all of our mechanisms we implicitly assume a preprocessing step that removes all the
agents with declared costs exceeding B. The resulting instance (given as input to the corresponding
mechanism) has the same set of optimal solutions subject to the budget constraint as the original
one. Note that in the case of the online mechanism GenSm-Online rejecting such agents as they
arrive suffices.
Remark 2.6. We should stress that wherever tie-breaking is needed (e.g., in lines 3 and 10 of
Simultaneous Greedy, during the execution of the auxiliary algorithms alg1, alg2 and alg3, etc.),
we assume the consistent use of a tie-breaking rule that is independent of the declared costs. An
obvious such choice would be a deterministic lexicographic tie-breaking rule.
Due to space restrictions, several of our proofs are deferred to the full version of this paper [3].
3 AN EFFICIENT MECHANISM FOR SUBMODULAR OBJECTIVES
The main result of this section is the first O(1)-approximation mechanism (termed GenSm-Main
below) for non-monotone submodular valuation functions.
Theorem 3.1. GenSm-Main is a universally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible, O(1)-
approximation mechanism.
At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular
maximization under a knapsack constraint (Simultaneous Greedy below). As we mentioned in the
Introduction, all known mechanisms use the same greedy subroutine: sort all agents in decreasing
order of marginal value per cost and pick as many agents as possible before hitting some threshold.
While for monotone submodular objectives this gives a non-trivial approximation guarantee, for
non-monotone objectives may result in arbitrarily bad solutions. Moreover, continuous algorithmic
approaches for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint [24, 32]
seem very unlikely to yield monotone allocation rules, and thus truthful mechanisms. The only
algorithm that is conceptually close to our approach is the two-pass greedy algorithm of Gupta et
al. [28], that runs Sviridenko’s greedy algorithm twice and then maximizes without the knapsack
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constraint to get a deterministic 6-approximate solution. The intuition behind this approach is
that submodularity prevents the greedy algorithm from getting stuck in consecutive “bad” local
maxima. Despite being significantly simpler, however, this two-pass greedy algorithm still suffers
irreparably with respect to monotonicity, as it allows agents to jump from one solution to the other
by changing their cost.
Here we introduce Simultaneous Greedy, a greedy mechanism that builds two candidate
solutions simultaneously. While the analysis of Gupta et al. [28] does not apply here (our solutions
are neither built sequentially nor according to the standard greedy algorithm), the way we obtain
our approximation guarantee is of the same flavor: at least one of the solutions will contain an
approximately optimal set. At the same time Simultaneous Greedy prevents agents to choose their
favorite candidate solution by misreporting their cost. To achieve that, we offer each agent a take-it-
or-leave-it price based on an estimate x of the optimal value which we obtain by sampling. This is
the first mechanism for the problem where it is crucial that the agents are not ordered with respect
to their marginal value per cost. This will further allow us to appropriately modify Simultaneous
Greedy for the online setting of Section 4 while maintaining all its desired properties.
The parameter β is later set to 9.185 in order to get the approximation factor of Corollary 3.8
but, otherwise, our analysis is independent of its value. alg2 in line 9 can be any approximation
algorithm for unconstrained non-monotone submodular maximization. In particular, here we may
use the deterministic 2-approximation algorithm of Buchbinder and Feldman [13].
Simultaneous Greedy(D,v, cD ,B,x)
1 S1 = S2 = ∅; B1 = B2 = B;U = D /* each Sj has its own budget Bj */
2 while maxi ∈U , j ∈{1,2} v(i |Sj ) > 0 do
3 Let (ıˆ, ˆ) ∈ argmaxi ∈U , j ∈{1,2} v(i |Sj )
4 if cıˆ ≤ βBx v(ıˆ |S ˆ ) ≤ B ˆ then
5 S ˆ = S ˆ ∪ {ıˆ}
6 B ˆ = B ˆ − βBx v(ıˆ |S ˆ )
7 U = U {ıˆ}
8 for j ∈ {1, 2} do
9 Tj = alg2(Sj ) /* a 2-approximate solution with respect to opt(Sj , v, cSj , ∞) */
10 Let S be the best solution among S1, S2,T1,T2
11 return S
Ideally, we would like the rate parameter x to be close to opt(A,B) and also to be robust in the
sense that no single agent can significantly affect its value. To achieve that, Sample-then-Greedy
randomly partitions the set of agents into two sets A1 and A2, then approximately solves the
problem on A1 to obtain an estimate of opt(A1,B), and finally uses this x to set the threshold rate
for Simultaneous Greedy on A2.
alg1 in line 2 can be any approximation algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization
subject to a knapsack constraint. In particular, here we may use the e-approximation algorithm of
Kulik et al. [32] (also see Remark 3.9).
Sample-then-Greedy(A,v, c,B)
1 Put each agent of A in either A1 or A2 independently at random with probability 12
2 x = v(alg1(A1)) /* an e-approximation of opt(A1, v, cA1, B) */
3 return Simultaneous Greedy(A2,v, cA2 ,B,x)
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Lemma 3.6 in Subsection 3.1, due to Bei et al. [10] and Leonardi et al. [34], guarantees that with high
probability bothA1 andA2 contain enough value subject to the budget constraint for things to work,
as long as no agent is too valuable. The latter leads to the final mechanism GenSm-Main (General
Submodular-Main) that randomizes between all the above and just returning a best singleton.
GenSm-Main(A,v, c,B)
1 With probability p = 0.201 : return i∗ ∈ argmaxi ∈A v(i)
2 With probability 1 − p : return Sample-then-Greedy(A,v, c,B)
3.1 Proving the Properties of GenSm-Main
We fix some additional notation to facilitate the presentation of the proofs. We use (D,v, c,B,x)
for a generic instance given to Simultaneous Greedy and S for the set returned. By i1, i2, . . . , it
we denote the sequence of agents of D examined during this execution of the algorithm in this
exact order. All the agents of S clearly appear within this sequence, so for any particular ℓ ∈ S we
have that ℓ = ik for some k . By jk we denote the index ˆ picked during the kth execution of line 3
of Simultaneous Greedy, while by S (k )jk and B
(k)
jk
we denote the set S jk and its remaining budget,
respectively, at that time. Conventionally, we use notation like S (k+1)jk to denote S jk right after the
kth execution of line 7, even if line 3 is never executed more than k times. Recall that we use a
tie-breaking rule that is independent of the costs, as mentioned in Remark 2.6.
Lemma 3.2. The allocation rule defined by Simultaneous Greedy is monotone. Thus, using the
threshold payments of Myerson’s lemma, the resulting mechanism is truthful and individually rational.
In all the following statements, when we refer to mechanisms, we always assume threshold
payments. Before we study the total payment, we should point out that enforcing budget-feasibility
has been the main source of technical difficulties in the budget-feasible mechanism design literature.
A significant advantage of the take-it-or-leave-it approach used in threshold mechanisms like
Simultaneous Greedy is that the budget-feasibility becomes much more manageable. To some
extent this comes at the expense of the approximation guarantee and its analysis, but also offers
some additional flexibility that will be explored in Sections 4 and 5.
Lemma 3.3. The mechanism Simultaneous Greedy is budget-feasible.
Proof. Let S be the set returned given the instance (D,v, c,B,x) and fix ik ∈ S . We claim that
the payment pik (c) is exactly πk = βBx v
(
ik |S (k )jk
)
, i.e., ik ∈ S if and only if he bids c ′ik ≤ πk . First
note that ik cannot affect the time when he is examined by the mechanism or which agents come
before him. So, since c−ik is fixed, during the kth execution of line 3, he is always “offered” πk ;
either he accepts, i.e., c ′ik ≤ πk , and the algorithm proceeds in the exact same way as with c ′ik = cik
(see also the proof of Lemma 3.2) or he rejects, i.e., c ′ik > πk , and he is removed from the active set
of agents. Once an agent is removed, however, he is never reexamined and thus, if c ′ik > πk then ik
is not in the winning set.
Recall that S can be any of S1, S2,T1,T2. We will show that all four sets are budget-feasible.
Let T1 = {ia1 , ia2 , . . . , ia |T1 | } and S1 = {ib1 , ib2 , . . . , ib |S1 | }, where (ai )
|T1 |
i=1 is a subsequence of (bi ) |S1 |i=1
which is a subsequence of 1, 2, . . . , t . Recall that the budget B1 for S1 is never exhausted. We have
|T1 |∑
τ=1
πaτ ≤
|S1 |∑
τ=1
πbτ =
|S1 |∑
τ=1
βB
x
v
(
ibτ |S (bτ )jbτ
)
= B − B( |S1 |+1)1 ≤ B .
The first and the second sum represent the total payment when S = T1 and when S = S1, respectively.
The budget-feasibility of T2 and S2 is proved in the exact same way. 
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Corollary 3.4. The mechanism GenSm-Main is universally truthful, individually rational and
budget-feasible.
Lemma 3.5. If there is a positive integer ℓ such that maxi ∈D v(i) < xℓ ·β , then Simultaneous
Greedy(D,v, c,B,x) outputs a set S such that
v(S) ≥ min
{
ℓx
(ℓ + 1)β ,
1
6
(
opt(D,B) − 2x
β
)}
.
Proof. Let t be the number of times line 3 was executed. At the end of the tth iteration, U is
the set of agents never examined. That is,U only contains agents that have non-positive marginal
utilities with respect to S (t+1)1 and S
(t+1)
2 . For the sake of readability, we henceforth use S1 and
S2 to denote S (t+1)1 and S
(t+1)
2 , respectively. Let R = D (U ∪ S1 ∪ S2) be the agents ik that were
considered at some point by the mechanism but were rejected, i.e., not added to either S (k )1 or S
(k )
2 .
We first partition R into two sets depending on why the corresponding agents were rejected. The
set Rc =
{
ik | βBx v
(
ik |S (k)jk
)
< cıˆ
}
contains the agents rejected because the first inequality in line 4
was violated during the corresponding iteration. Similarly, the set RB =
{
ik | B(k )jk <
βB
x v
(
ik |S (k)jk
)}
contains the agents rejected because the second inequality in line 4 was violated. Clearly,R = Rc∪RB .
We consider two cases, depending on whether RB is empty or not.
Case 1. Assume that RB , ∅ and let ik ∈ RB . That is, during the kth execution of line 3, (ıˆ, ˆ) =
(ik , jk ), but βBx v
(
ik |S (k)jk
)
> B(k )jk . Let S
(k )
jk
= {ia1 , ia2 , . . . , ias }, where (ai )si=1 is a subsequence of
1, 2, . . . , t . Further, notice that, by its definition, B(k)jk = B −
∑s
τ=1
βB
x v
(
iaτ |S (aτ )jk
)
. We have
v
(
S (k )jk
)
=
s∑
i=1
v
(
iai |S (ai )jk
)
=
x
βB
(
B − B(k )jk
)
>
x
βB
(
B − B(k )jk
)
+
x
βB
B(k )jk −v
(
ik |S (k )jk
)
=
x
β
−v
(
ik |S (k )jk
)
. (1)
By submodularity and the way the agents in S (k )jk are chosen, we have
v(ia1 ) = v
(
ia1 |S (a1)jk
)
≥ v
(
ia2 |S (a2)jk
)
≥ . . . ≥ v
(
ias |S (as )jk
)
≥ v
(
ik |S (k )jk
)
.
Yet, each one of these values is at most maxi ∈D v(i) < xℓ ·β . Combining with (1), we have
ℓ ·max
i ∈D
v(i) < x
β
≤ v
(
S (k )jk
)
+v
(
ik |S (k )jk
)
≤
s∑
τ=1
v
(
iaτ |S (aτ )jk
)
+v
(
ik |S (k)jk
)
≤ (s + 1) · v (ia1 ) ,
and therefore, we conclude that
S (k )jk  = s ≥ ℓ. Now we repeat the same argument for the average
marginal value in the sum
∑s
τ=1v
(
iaτ |S (aτ )jk
)
. Using the simple observation that the smallest term
of a sum cannot exceed the average of the remaining terms, we get
x
β
≤ v
(
S (k)jk
)
+v
(
ik |S (k )jk
)
≤ v
(
S (k )jk
)
+
1
s
s∑
τ=1
v
(
iaτ |S (aτ )jk
)
≤ s + 1
s
v
(
S (k )jk
)
≤ ℓ + 1
ℓ
v
(
S (k )jk
)
, (2)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that f (z) = z+1z is decreasing.
Finally, to get the approximation guarantee for this case, we combine (2) with the fact that S is
at least as good as each greedy solution:
v(S) ≥ v(S jk ) ≥ v
(
S (k )jk
)
≥ ℓ
ℓ + 1 ·
x
β
.
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Case 2. Now assume that RB = ∅, i.e., R = Rc. Let C∗ be an optimal solution for the given instance
and define C1 = C∗ ∩ S1, C2 = C∗ ∩ S2 and C3 = C∗ (C1 ∪C2). By subadditivity, we have
opt(D,B) = v(C∗) ≤ v(C1) +v(C2) +v(C3) . (3)
Recall that Tj = alg2(S j ), j ∈ {1, 2}, is a 2-approximate solution with respect to opt(S j ,∞). Thus,
v(Cj ) ≤ opt(S j ,B) ≤ 2 · v(Tj ), for j ∈ {1, 2}, and inequality (3) gives
opt(D,B) ≤ 2v(T1) + 2v(T2) +v(C3) . (4)
Upper bounding v(C3) in terms of S1, S2,T1,T2 and r is somewhat more involved. We begin by
invoking the non-negativity of v , as well as its submodularity (as defined in of Definition 2.1(ii)) on
S1 ∪C3 and S2 ∪C3. We have
v(C3) ≤ v(C3) +v(S1 ∪C3 ∪ S2) ≤ v(S1 ∪C3) +v(S2 ∪C3) . (5)
In order to upper bound v(S1 ∪C3) we again use the submodularity of v , together with a couple
of facts about the marginal utilities of agents outside of S1. Since the mechanism stopped after t
iterations, maxi ∈D (S1∪S2∪R)v(i |S1) ≤ 0. Also, given that R = Rc, for all agents that got rejected at
some point, we know that they had very low marginal value per cost ratio with respect to both S1
and S2. In particular, if ik ∈ R, then cik > βBx v
(
ik |S (k )j
)
, for both j ∈ {1, 2}. We may now rely on
Definition 2.1(iii) to get
v(S1 ∪C3) ≤ v(S1) +
∑
ik ∈C3
v(ik |S1)
≤ v(S1) +
∑
ik ∈C3∩R
v(ik |S1) ( v(ik |S1) ≤ 0 for ik ∈ C3 R )
≤ v(S1) +
∑
ik ∈C3∩R
v
(
ik |S (k )1
)
( by submodularity, v(ik |S1) ≤ v
(
ik |S(k )1
)
for ik ∈ D )
≤ v(S1) +
∑
ik ∈C3∩R
x
βB
cik (
βB
x v
(
ik |S(k )1
)
< cik for ik ∈ R )
Similarly, v(S2 ∪C3) ≤ v(S2) +∑ik ∈C3∩R xβB cik . Also, recall that ∑i ∈C∗ ci ≤ B to get
v(S j ∪C3) ≤ v(S j ) + x
β
, for j ∈ {1, 2} . (6)
Finally, we may combine (4), (5) and (6) to get
opt(D,B) ≤ 2v(T1) + 2v(T2) +v(S1 ∪C3) +v(S2 ∪C3)
≤ 2v(T1) + 2v(T2) +v(S1) +v(S2) + 2x
β
≤ 6 · v(S) + 2x
β
,
or, equivalently, v(S) ≥ 16
(
opt(D,B) − 2xβ
)
.
Combining Case 1 and Case 2, we obtain the claimed guarantee. 
So far, unless x = Θ(opt(D,B)), the approximation guarantee seems to be rather weak. In
fact, the way Simultaneous Greedy is used within Sample-then-Greedy requires that both
x = v(alg1(A1)) and opt(A2,B) are Θ(opt(A,B)). The next technical lemma guarantees that this
happens with high probability, unless there is an extremely valuable agent.
Lemma 3.6 (Follows from Bei et al. [10] and Leonardi et al. [34]). Consider any submodular
function v(·). For any given subsetT ⊆ A and a positive integer k assume that v(T ) ≥ k ·maxi ∈T v(i).
Further, suppose thatT is divided uniformly at random into two subsetsT1 andT2. Then with probability
at least 12 , we have that v(T1) ≥ k−14k v(T ) and v(T2) ≥ k−14k v(T ).
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We are now ready to lower bound the approximation guarantee of Sample-then-Greedy.
Lemma 3.7. Assume that for some positive integer k , opt(A,B) > k · maxi ∈Av(i). Then with
probability at least 12 , Sample-then-Greedy(A,v, c,B) outputs a set S such that
v(S) ≥ min

⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋(k − 1)
e
( ⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋
+ 1
) , β(k − 1) − 8k6  ·
1
4βk · opt(A,B) .
Proof. LetC∗ be an optimal solution for the given instance. By applying Lemma 3.6 withT = C∗
we have that with probability at least 1/2 it holds that v(Ai ∩C∗) ≥ k−14k v(C∗) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. In
what follows we assume that this is indeed the case. Thus,
opt(A,B) ≥ x = v(alg1(A1)) ≥ 1
e
opt(A1,B) ≥ k − 14ek opt(A,B)
and also opt(A2,B) ≥ k−14k opt(A,B).2
The lower bound on x paired with the upper bound on maxi ∈Av(i), imply that
max
i ∈A
v(i) < 1
k
· opt(A,B) ≤ 1
k
· 4ekβ
k − 1 ·
x
β
≤ 1⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋ · x
β
.
Thus, we can use Lemma 3.5 with D = A2, x = v(alg1(A1)) and ℓ =
⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋
. Therefore, Simulta-
neous Greedy(A2,v, cA2 ,B,x) outputs an S such that
v(S) ≥ min

⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋
x( ⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋
+ 1
)
β
,
1
6
(
opt(A2,B) − 2x
β
)
≥ min

⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋(k − 1)
4ek
( ⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋
+ 1
)
β
opt(A,B) , 16
(
k − 1
4k opt(A,B) −
2
β
opt(A,B)
)
≥ min

⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋(k − 1)
e
( ⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋
+ 1
) , β(k − 1) − 8k6  ·
1
4βk · opt(A,B) . 
Corollary 3.8. The set S returned by GenSm-Main(A,v, c,B) satisfies
505 · E(v(S)) ≥ opt(A,B) .
Proof. Suppose thatmaxi ∈Av(i) ≥ 1101 · opt(A,B). Then, with probability p at least 1/101 of the
optimal value is returned. Hence,
E(v(S)) ≥ p ·max
i ∈A
v(i) ≥ 0.201101 · opt(A,B) ≥
1
505 · opt(A,B) .
Next suppose that maxi ∈Av(i) < 1101 · opt(A,B). We may apply Lemma 3.7 with k = 101. As
discussed before the description of mechanism Simultaneous Greedy, the parameter β is is equal
to 9.185. This implies that
⌊ k−1
4eβ
⌋
= 1. By substituting the values of k and β to the bound of Lemma
3.7, we get that with probability at least (1 − p)/2
v(S) ≥ min
{
50
e
,
110.5
6
}
· 13710.74 · opt(A,B) ≥
1
201.7367 · opt(A,B) ,
2For the sake of presentation, here we write x = v(alg1(A1)) ≥ 1e opt(A1, B) rather than the technically correct E(x ) ≥
1
e opt(A1, B). However, as discussed in Remark 3.9, one can formally deal with this issue with a negligible effect on the
expected approximation guarantee while keeping the running time polynomial.
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and thus,
E(v(S)) ≥ 1 − 0.2012 ·
1
201.7367 · opt(A,B) ≥
1
505 · opt(A,B) . 
Remark 3.9. In our mechanisms we often use randomized approximation algorithms as sub-
routines. In particular, alg1 in Sample-then-Greedy and GenSm-Online and alg3 in MonSm-
Constrained are randomized. Yet, in the description of our mechanisms—and more importantly
in our analyses—we treat them as if there were deterministic, e.g., we assume that x in line 2 of
Sample-then-Greedy is at least 1e · opt(A1,v, cA1 ,B). While this is not technically accurate, we
do so for the sake of presentation. However, we may instead use the fact that for any constants
δ ,η > 0, alg1 can be modified so that with probability at least 1 − δ it returns a solution of value
at least
( 1
e − η
) · opt(A1,v, cA1 ,B) in polynomial time, using standard arguments. Thus, for any
constant ε > 0 the analysis of GenSm-Main can be adjusted to hold for an approximation factor
505 + ε instead. Similarly, the analyses of our other mechanisms can be adjusted accordingly.
4 ONLINE PROCUREMENT
Note that the mechanism presented in the last section already bares some resemblance to online
algorithms for the secretary model (although truthfulness is rarely a requirement there). Namely, a
part of the input is only used to estimate the quality of the optimal solution and then, based on that
estimation, some threshold is set for the remaining instance. On a high level, this is straightforward
to adjust for the secretary model; we use the first (roughly) half of the stream of agents to find
an estimate of opt(A,B) and then set a threshold similar to the one in Simultaneous Greedy.
However, there are a few issues one has to deal with.
First, Simultaneous Greedy goes through the agents in a specific order (in decreasing order of
the maximum marginal value with respect to either one of the two constructed sets). Even though
this fact is indeed used in the proof of Lemma 3.5, we show that even examining agents in arbitrary
order works well, albeit with a somewhat worse approximation factor. Note that this is not true
when there are other constraints on top of the budget-feasibility requirement, as in Section 5.
Second, towards the end, in line 9, Simultaneous Greedy runs an unconstrained submodular
maximization algorithm on S1 and S2 to possibly reveal a subset of them with much higher value.
While this is a critical step, we rely on a very elegant result of Feige et al. [21]: a uniformly random
set gives a 4-approximation for the unconstrained problem. Thus, every agent that passes the
threshold and is added to S j is only accepted to Tj with probability 1/2. The actual output of the
mechanism is a random choice S between S1, S2,T1 andT2, made before the arrival of the first agent.
So, while the four sets are built obliviously with respect to the choice of S , the agents added to S
are irrevocably chosen while everyone else is irrevocably discarded.
One last issue is that we want the mechanism to occasionally return the single most valuable
agent. This, however, is easily resolved by runningDynkin’s algorithm [19] with constant probability
instead. This mechanism samples the first n/e agents and then it picks the first agent i ′, among the
remaining agents, who is at least as good as the best agent in the sample, i.e.,v(i ′) ≥ maxk≤n/e v(ik ).
This guarantees that E(v(i ′)) ≥ 1e maxi ∈Av(i), where the expectation is over the order of the agents.
The mechanism GenSm-Online below incorporates all these adjustments, yet maintains all
the good properties of GenSm-Main. We assume a secretary setting, where the agents arrive
uniformly at random. In particular, agents have no control over their arrival time, so this is still a
single-parameter environment and truthfulness still means universal truthfulness, i.e., if we fix the
random bits of the mechanism, then for any arrival order no agent has an incentive to lie.
Again, alg1 is the e-approximation algorithm of Kulik et al. [32]. The parameter β is set to 8.725
and, like the parameter in Simultaneous Greedy, is only relevant for the approximation factor.
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Theorem 4.1. GenSm-Online is a universally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible
online mechanism and achieves an O(1)-approximation in the secretary model.
One immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1 is the existence of anO(1)-approximation algorithm
for the non-monotone Submodular Knapsack Secretary Problem (SKS). To the best of our knowledge
GenSm-Online is the first such algorithm (see also Remark 4.3).
Formally, an instance of SKS consists of a ground set A = [n], a non-negative submodular
objective v : A→ R+ and a given budget B. The elements of A arrive in a uniformly random order
and each element must be accepted or rejected immediately upon arrival. An algorithm for SKS
has access to n = |A|, to the costs of items that have arrived (i.e., each cost is revealed upon arrival)
and to a value oracle that, given a subset S ⊆ A of elements that have already arrived, returns v(S).
The objective is to accept a set of elements maximizing v without exceeding the budget.
It is straightforward to see that the only difference of SKS with the online procurement problem
studied in this section is the information about the costs. In SKS there is no notion of misreporting
a cost and thus it can be seen as a special case of our online problem where agents are guaranteed
to always reveal their true costs.
Corollary 4.2. There is an O(1)-approximation algorithm for the non-monotone SKS.
Remark 4.3. Bateni et al.[9] give an O(1)-approximation algorithm for the monotone SKS. They
claim, without a proof, that their result extends to the non-monotone SKS as well, using the
same ideas that work for the Submodular Secretary problem with a cardinality or a matroid
constraint (rather than a knapsack constraint). However, this does not seem to be the case. It is
indeed true that these ideas do pair well with cardinality and, more generally, (intersection of)
matroid constraints and they have been recently used to obtain fast randomized algorithms with
good approximation guarantees [14, 22]. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there are
no examples in the literature where this random greedy approach does work for non-monotone
submodular maximization with knapsack constraints.
GenSm-Online(A,v, c,B)
1 With probability q = 0.4 :
2 Run Dynkin’s algorithm and return the winner
3 With probability 1 − q :
4 S1 = S2 = T1 = T2 = ∅; B1 = B2 = B
5 S =
{
Sj , with probability 1/10, for each j ∈ {1, 2}
Tj , with probability 2/5, for each j ∈ {1, 2}
6 Draw ξ from the binomial distribution B(n, 0.5)
7 Let A1 be the set of the first ξ agents, and A2 = A A1
8 Reject all the agents in A1 and calculate x = v(alg1(A1))
9 for each i ∈ A2 as he arrives do
10 Let ˆ ∈ argmaxj ∈{1,2} v(i |Sj )
11 if ci ≤ βBx v(i |S ˆ ) ≤ B ˆ then
12 S ˆ = S ˆ ∪ {i}
13 B ˆ = B ˆ − βBx v(i |S ˆ )
14 With probability 1/2, T ˆ = T ˆ ∪ {i}; otherwise, T ˆ = T ˆ
15 Update S /* the update is consistent to the choice made in line 5 */
16 return S
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5 ADDING COMBINATORIAL CONSTRAINTS
To illustrate the applicability of our approach, we turn to the case where the solution has to satisfy
some additional combinatorial constraint. With the exception of additive valuation functions [1, 35],
even formonotone submodular objectives no polynomial-time mechanisms using only value queries
are known. Here we show that the general approach of GenSm-Main can be utilized to achieve
an O(p)-approximation for p-systems, i.e., for independence systems with rank quotient at most p.
In particular, as stated in Corollary 5.4, this implies constant factor approximation for cardinality,
matroid and matching constraints. As it is shown in Section 6, going beyond independence systems
(e.g., require that the solution forms a spanning tree) is hindered by strong impossibility results.
Definition 5.1. An independence system is a pair (U ,I), whereU is a finite set and I ⊆ 2U is a
family of subsets, whose members are called the independent sets ofU and satisfy: (i) ∅ ∈ I, and
(ii) if B ∈ I and A ⊆ B, then A ∈ I.
Given a set S ⊆ U , a maximal independent set contained in S is called a basis of S . The upper rank
ur(S) (resp. the lower rank lr(S)) is defined as the cardinality of a largest (resp. smallest) basis of S .
A p-system (U ,I) is an independence system such that maxS ⊆U ur(S)/lr(S) ≤ p.
For the sake of readability, we present the case of monotone submodular objectives here; the
non-monotone case is deferred to the full version. A technical highlight of our analysis, later used
for the non-monotone case as well, is Claim 5.3. The claim crucially depends on the order we
consider the agents, in order to bound the value lost because of the p-system constraint.
As usual, we assume the existence of an independence oracle. In particular, when we write that
I is part of the input of the mechanism, we mean that the mechanism has access to a membership
oracle for I. The parameter β is later set to 13/3. alg3 in line 5 can be any approximation algorithm
for monotone submodular maximization subject to a knapsack and a p-system constraint. Here we
assume the (p + 3)-approximation algorithm of Badanidiyuru and Vondrák [7].
MonSm-Constrained(A,I,v, c,B)
1 With probability q = 0.2 :
2 return i∗ ∈ argmaxi ∈A v(i)
3 With probability 1 − q :
4 Put each agent of A in either A1 or A2 independently at random with probability 12
5 x = v(alg3(A1)) /* a (p + 3)-approximation of opt(A1, v, cA1, B) */
6 S = ∅; BR = B;U = A2
7 whileU , ∅ do
8 Let ıˆ ∈ argmaxi ∈U v(i |S)
9 if cıˆ ≤ βBx v(ıˆ |S) ≤ BR and S ∪ {ıˆ} ∈ I then
10 S = S ∪ {ıˆ}
11 BR = BR − βBx v(ıˆ |S)
12 U = U {ıˆ}
13 return S
Theorem 5.2. Assuming that the solution has to be an independent set of a p-system, there is a
universally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible, O(p)-approximation mechanism that runs
in polynomial time for (non-monotone) submodular objectives.
Proof. Here we prove the theorem for the non-monotone case. First, we observe that S starts as
an independent set, namely the empty set, and it is expanded only if it remains an independent set.
Hence, at the endMonSm-Constrained does return a feasible solution, i.e., S is in I.
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At this point, following the same reasoning used for GenSm-Main and GenSm-Online, it should
be easy to see that MonSm-Constrained is universally truthful, individually rational, budget-
feasible, and runs in polynomial time.
Next we show that the solution returned by the mechanism is an O(p)-approximation of
the optimum. First, suppose that maxi ∈Av(i) ≥ opt(A,B)/(26(p + 10)). Then, for the set S re-
turned by MonSm-Constrained, E(v(S)) ≥ q · maxi ∈Av(i) ≥ 15 · opt(A,B)/(26(p + 10)) ≥
opt(A,B)/(138(p + 10)).
For the case where maxi ∈Av(i) < opt(A,B)/(26(p + 10)), we follow the same notation and the
same high level approach as with the approximation guarantees of GenSm-Main and GenSm-
Online. So, i1, i2, . . . , i |A2 | are the agents of A2 in the order considered by the mechanism. By S (k )
and B(k )R we denote S and BR , respectively, at the time ik arrives, and we only use S for the final
set returned. The set R = A2 S contains the agents ik that were not added to S (k ) and it is further
partitioned to Rc =
{
ik | βBx v
(
ik |S (k )
)
< cıˆ
}
, RB =
{
ik | B(k )R < βBx v
(
ik |S (k )
)}
, and RI = R (Rc∪RB ).
Assume that opt(Ai ,B) ≥ k−14k opt(A,B) for i ∈ {1, 2}, where k = 26(p + 10). Thus, x =
v(alg1(A1)) ≥ k−14(p+3)k opt(A,B). Recall that this does happenwith probability at least 12 , as discussed
in the beginning of the proof of Lemma 3.7.
Case 1. Assume that RB , ∅. Let ik ∈ RB , i.e., βBx v
(
ik |S (k)
)
> B(k )R . Using the same argument as in
the proof of Lemma 3.5, we get v
(
S (k)
) ≥ xβ −maxi ∈Av(i) and, given the known bounds on x and
maxi ∈Av(i), this leads to v(S) ≥
( k−1
4(p+3)kβ − 1k
) · opt(A,B).
By substituting k = 26(p + 10) and β = 133 , it is a matter of simple calculations to get
v(S) ≥ 5276(p + 10) · opt(A,B) . (7)
Case 2. Assume that RB = ∅ and let C∗ be an optimal solution for the instance (A2,v, cA2 ,B). By
monotonicity, we have
opt(A2,B) = v(C∗) ≤ v(S ∪C∗) . (8)
Because of the p-system constraint, however, deriving the analog of inequality (6) needs some extra
work. By Definition 2.1(iii), we have
v(S ∪C∗) ≤ v(S) +
∑
ik ∈C∗ S
v(ik |S) ≤ v(S) +
∑
ik ∈C∗∩Rc
v(ik |S) +
∑
ik ∈C∗∩RI
v(ik |S) . (9)
We may upper bound the first sum using the fact that all agents involved got rejected because they
had very low marginal value per cost ratio. That is,∑
ik ∈C∗∩Rc
v(ik |S) ≤
∑
ik ∈C∗∩Rc
v
(
ik |S (k )
)
<
x
βB
∑
ik ∈C∗∩Rc
cik ≤
x
β
≤ opt(A,B)
β
. (10)
For the second sum we prove the following result that crucially relies on the fact that agents are
examined in decreasing marginal value.
Claim 5.3.
∑
ik ∈C∗∩RI v(ik |S) ≤ p · v(S) .
Proof of Claim 5.3. Recall that when we index agents we follow the ordering imposed by the
mechanism, i.e., ik is always the agent picked at the kth execution of line 8 ofMonSm-Constrained.
Suppose that there is a mapping f : C∗ ∩ RI → S such that
(i) if f (ik ) = iℓ , then v
(
ik |S (k )
)
≤ v
(
iℓ |S (ℓ)
)
for all ik ∈ C∗ ∩ RI , and
(ii)
f −1(iℓ) ≤ p for all iℓ ∈ S .
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We slightly abuse the notation and write S f (ik ) instead of S (ℓ) when f (ik ) = iℓ . The existence of f
implies that∑
ik ∈C∗∩RI
v(ik |S) ≤
∑
ik ∈C∗∩RI
v
(
ik |S (k )
)
≤
∑
ik ∈C∗∩RI
v
(
f (ik ) | S f (ik )
)
≤ p ·
∑
iℓ ∈S
v
(
iℓ |S (ℓ)
)
= p · v(S) .
The first inequality follows from the submodularity of v , while the second and third inequalities
follow from (i) and (ii), respectively.
Next, we are going to construct such an f . Let S = {ia1 , ia2 , . . . , ias } and C∗ ∩ RI = {ib1 , ib2 , . . . ,
ibt }, where both (ai )si=1 and (bi )ti=1 are subsequences of 1, 2, . . . , |A2 |. We are going to map the first
p elements of C∗ ∩ RI , ib1 , . . . , ibp , to ia1 , the next p elements ibp+1 , . . . , ib2p , to ia2 , and so on. That
is, f (ibj ) = ia⌈j/p⌉ .
It is straightforward that f satisfies property (ii). In order to prove property (i), it suffices to show
that for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}, agent ibj is considered by MonSm-Constrained after agent f (ibj ).
Indeed, if that was the case, by the definition of ıˆ in line 8 and submodularity, we would get
v
(
ia⌈j/p⌉ | S (a⌈j/p⌉ )
)
≥ v
(
ibj | S (a⌈j/p⌉ )
)
≥ v
(
ibj | S (bj )
)
,
for all ibj ∈ C∗ ∩ RI , as desired. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is some k ∈
{1, 2, . . . , t}, such that bk < a ⌈k/p ⌉ ; in fact, suppose k is the smallest such index. Consider the
sets T = {ia1 , ia2 , . . . , ia⌈k/p⌉−1 } ⊆ S and Q = {ib1 , ib2 , . . . , ibk } ⊆ C∗ ∩ RI . By construction, T ∈ I.
Moreover, we claim that T is maximally independent in T ∪Q . Indeed, each ibτ ∈ Q was rejected
because S (bτ )∪{ibτ } < I, and since S (bτ ) ⊆ T we getT ∪{ibτ } < I. This implies that lr(T ∪Q) ≤ |T |.
On the other hand, Q ∈ I because Q ⊆ C∗ ∈ I. As a result ur(T ∪Q) ≥ |Q |. However, notice that
p · |T | = p (⌈k/p⌉ − 1) < p (k/p + 1 − 1) = k = |Q | .
Thus, ur(T∪Q )lr(T∪Q ) ≥ |Q ||T | > p, contradicting the fact that (A,I) is a p-system. We conclude that f
satisfies both (i) and (ii), and therefore,
∑
ik ∈C∗∩RI v(ik |S) ≤ p · v(S). ▹
Now, combining (8), (9), (10), and Claim 5.3, we have opt(A2,B) ≤ (p + 1) · v(S) + opt(A,B)β , and
using the lower bound on opt(A2,B), v(S) ≥ 1p+1 ·
( k−1
4k − 1β
)
opt(A,B). Again, by substituting k
and β , it is a matter of calculations to get
v(S) ≥ 5276(p + 10) · opt(A,B) . (11)
By Lemma 3.6, both (7) and (11) hold with probability at least 1/2. Hence,
E(v(S)) ≥ (1 − q) · 12 ·
5
276(p + 10) · opt(A,B) =
1
138(p + 10) · opt(A,B) . 
For matroid constraints we have p = 1 and for matching constraints p = 2. Since cardinality
constraints are a special case of matroid constraint, we directly get the following.
Corollary 5.4. For cardinality, matroid and matching constraints, there is a universally truthful,
budget-feasible O(1)-approximation mechanism for (non-monotone) submodular objectives.
6 LOWER BOUNDS
In the value query model there is a strong lower bound on the number of queries for deterministic
algorithms for monotone XOS objectives due to Singer [40]. This result is based on a lower bound
of Mirrokni et al. [36] on welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions. As the latter also holds
for randomized algorithms, so does Singer’s result as well, essentially with the same proof. We
restate it here for completeness. Note that it holds even when the costs are public knowledge.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: May 2019.
EC’19 Session 7c: Mechanism Design II
916
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives 17
Theorem 6.1 (Singer [40]). For any fixed ε > 0, any (randomized) n 12−ε -approximation algorithm
for monotone XOS function maximization subject to a budget constraint requires exponentially many
value queries (in expectation).
When one moves to non-monotone objectives, as it is the case in this work, it is possible to prove
even stronger lower bounds. Below we show that for general XOS objectives, exponentially many
value queries are needed for any non-trivial approximation even without the budget constraint. As
this result applies to the purely algorithmic setting, it is of independent interest.
It is known that in many settings there is a separation between the power of value and demand
queries of polynomial size, see, e.g., [11]. To stress this difference in our setting, recall that in the
demand query model, the class of XOS objectives admits a truthfulO(1)-approximation mechanism
with a polynomial number of queries.
Theorem 6.2. For any fixed ε > 0, any (randomized) n1−ε -approximation algorithm for XOS
function maximization requires exponentially many value queries (in expectation).
One immediate consequence of Theorem 6.2 is that when we care for constant approximation
ratios, the result of Theorem 3.1 is (asymptotically) the best possible for budget-feasible mechanism
design. General submodular objectives is the broadest class of well studied non-monotone functions
one could hope for, even for randomized mechanisms.
Combinatorial Constraints.We now turn to the problem of maximizing subject to additional
constraints on top of the budget constraint. To further motivate our restriction to p-system con-
straints, we restate here a lower bound of Badanidiyuru and Vondrák [7]: for independence system
constraints one cannot achieve an approximation factor better thanmaxS ⊆U ur(S )lr(S ) with a polynomial
number of queries. Thus, the result of Theorem 5.2 is asymptotically optimal.
Theorem 6.3 (Badanidiyuru and Vondrák [7]). For any fixed ε > 0, any (randomized) (p + ε)-
approximation algorithm for additive function maximization subject to p-system constraints requires
exponentially many independence oracle queries (in expectation).
As we mentioned in the beginning of Section 5, we cannot really go beyond independence
systems and have any non-trivial approximation guarantee in polynomial time. This is illustrated
in Theorem 6.4 and Corollary 6.5 below. Theorem 6.4 generalizes Singer’s [40] strong impossibility
result for deterministically “hiring a team of agents” to any constraint that is not downward closed
below. Note that it holds even for super-constant approximation ratios, even for the special case of
additive objectives, irrespectively of any complexity assumptions.
Theorem 6.4. Let F ⊆ 2A be any collection of feasible sets that is not downward closed. Then there
is no deterministic, truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible mechanism achieving a bounded
approximation when restricted on F , even for additive objectives.
The next corollary of Theorem 6.3 states that under general combinatorial constraints it is
not possible to achieve any non-trivial approximation with polynomially many queries. While it
is not hard to prove it directly, given Theorem 6.3 it suffices to notice that such a lower bound
holds even for general independence systems. Indeed, there are cases where ur(U )lr(U ) is Θ(n) like the
(n − 1)-systems of independent sets of star graphs.
Corollary 6.5. For any fixed ε > 0, any (randomized) n1−ε -approximation algorithm for additive
function maximization subject to general feasibility constraints requires exponentially many queries
(in expectation).
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